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the so called “nuclear renaissance” is creating a millionaire market for 
new nuclear reactors. Few firms have the capabilities to work in this 
complex and highly demanding market, whereas many other are inves-
tigating the option to enter. Quite surprising the international scientific 
literature provides information regarding the high-level governmen-
tal aspects of nuclear power programs in different countries while the 
analysis at firm level is almost inexistent. Moreover the usual business 
models for the manufacturing industry are not suitable since the nuclear 
market is very peculiar. In particular is unclear how an EPC (Engineering 
Procurement and Construction) company can enter in it. This paper deals 
with this question investigating how an EPC firms or general contractor 
can enter in the nuclear market. The case study methodology has been 
widely used to understand the time, cost, enabling factors and barriers 
to enter in the nuclear business in the most important roles: Architect/
Engineering, NSSS supplier, TG supplier, Construction. The results show 
that there are strong similarities among companies acting as main con-
tractor in the same field; therefore it is possible to generalize a large set 
of meaningful lessons learned.
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS
Nowadays the nuclear market is in a 
really dynamic condition. Even after 
the Fukushima Daichi accident (which 
caused different reactions in govern-
mental plans for nuclear energy de-
velopment) several countries declared 
their renewed support and conviction 
in nuclear energy. Among the others 
United Kingdom, France, Romania, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia declared their inten-
tions to not change their nuclear poli-
cies (Foratom, 2011). One of the most 
positive demonstrations toward the 
nuclear power technology has been 
made by Saudi Arabia, with its inten-
tion to build 16 new nuclear reactors 
over the next 20 years, for a $300 bil-




or the event more recent plans of Be-
larus and Turkey. Even if the market is 
very attractive the project delivery chain 
(supplier, general contractors, advisor 
etc.) is not enough developed to satisfy 
the markets demand; therefore many 
firms are expected to enter the nuclear 
business. The Project Delivery Chain 
(PDC) is defined as the individuals and 
organizations involved in the project, 
with interests that may be positively or 
negatively affected as a result of project 
execution. The components may also 
exert influence over the project and its 
results (Project Management Institute, 
2000). The PDC for a Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP) project changes along with 
the contractual approach used, however 
the following designations are always 
present (IAEA, 1988):
 X Public authority;
 X Regulatory body;
 X Utility;
 X Main contractor;
 X Architect-engineer (AE);
 X Consultant;
 X Subcontractor.
This paper deals with EPC (Engi-
neering Procurement and Construction) 
firms and therefore focuses on the roles 
of Main Contractors and Architect/Engi-
neer (AE). Main contractors are the orga-
nizations in charge of the execution of 
complete functional system (packages) 
of the nuclear power project. They are 
key stakeholders in the project gover-
nance (Ruuska et al., 2011) and their de-
cisions are fundamental for the project 
success as demonstrated by the recent 
projects “Olkiluoto 3” and “Flamanville 
3” (Locatelli and Mancini, 2012). The 
scope of a main contract typically com-
prises a fairly self-sufficient package 
with a minimum of external interfaces, 
in the form of major sections of the 
plant, systems or services. The main 
contractors would plan, engineer and 
commission the contracted portion of 
the plant according to the specifications 
and requirements of the utility and with 
allowance for the interfaces to other 
contractors, often under a package con-
tract with a fixed price and schedule. 
They are responsible for the manage-
ment of the project and sometimes the 
whole program (Locatelli and Mancini, 
2010). A main contractor independently 
manages the subcontracts for his por-
tion of the plant, possibly with a consent 
right by the utility. 
In the Nuclear Business there are 
mainly three different types of contract 
(IAEA, 1999):
 X Turnkey approach, where a single con-
tractor or a consortium of contractors 
takes the overall responsibility for the 
whole works.
 X Split-package approach, where the 
overall responsibility is divided be-
tween a relatively small numbers of 
contractors, each coping with a large 
section of the works.
 X Multi-contract approach, where the 
owner, or his architect-engineer, as-
sumes overall responsibility for en-
gineering the station, issuing a large 
number of contracts.
Due to its widespread application the 
multi-contract approach will be the 
reference for this work moreover, with 
the opportune adaptations (mainly it 
changes the owner and the risk sharing 
approach), also the other approaches 
can be traced back to this one. Multi-
contract approach allows the subdivi-
sions of a NPP project in a set of stan-
dard roles and scopes of work. In this 
type of approach, prime contractors are 
defined as the company (or the compa-
nies) winning a contract for any of the 
roles defined in Figure 1.
The multi-contract approach showed in 
Figure 1 divides roles as follows (IAEA, 
2004):
 X Architect/Engineer (AE): Project man-
agement and engineering manage-
ment support; owner’s personnel 
training; support services to owner on 
procurement, construction & commis-
sioning; other related activities. The 
term AE is generally applied to organi-
zations which specialize in planning, 
engineering and managing industrial 
installations and buildings. AE firms 
can therefore combine a great deal 
of experience and accumulate expert 
know-how transferable from one proj-
ect to another.
 X Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) 
supplier: System & component de-
sign; equipment supply; delivery of 
raw material specimens for LBB (Leak 
Before Break) analysis and other ser-
vices (technical support, licensing and 
training);
 X Turbo-Generator (TG) supplier: Equip-
ment supply including design, engi-
neering & related information; tests; 
services; training of owner’s person-
nel; and spare parts;
 X Construction contractors: Civil/archi-
tectural work, piping and cabling work, 
installation and erection of mechanical 
and electrical equipment, yard facili-
ties and commission support within 
their scope of work. 
The percentage of the total overnight 
cost allocated to each role is showed 
in Table 1.
Figure 1 NPP's PDC: multi-contract approach
AE NSSS 
supplier TG supplier Constructor
Owner
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So, even if the market is huge and re-
ally attractive is unclear how an Engi-
neering Procurement and Construction 
(EPC) firm working in other sectors 
(chemical, Oil&Gas, etc.) can enter in 
the nuclear business. In particular the 
literature shows a huge lack of informa-
tion concerning modalities and require-
ments for a General contractor/ EPC 
company to enter the nuclear business 
in these aforementioned roles, there-
fore this gap arises five main research 
questions:
Q1: Which are the drivers shap-
ing the PDC in a nuclear power plant 
project?
Q2: Which are the main barriers to 
enter the nuclear power plant business?
Q3: Which are the enabling factors 
leading a company to proficiently en-
ter the nuclear power plant business?
Q4: Do exist paths, leading to an 
entry in nuclear power plant PDC?
Q5: How much time and investment 
must a company face to enter nuclear 
power plant business? Are they dif-
ferent along with diverse contractual 
roles?
In order to answer to these research 
questions this paper summaries the 
information provided by several case 
studies of firms already entered the 
nuclear business.
Case Study methodology
Case Study methodology is a scientific 
method extensively used as a technique 
to describe and understand not only the 
players of global nuclear market, but 
also dynamics leading the companies 
to enter the market. In order to under-
stand the different scenarios analyzed, 
it is necessary to present the theory of 
this research method and how it has 
been implemented.
Description
The case studies presented in this paper 
have been developed according to two 
main references: (Yin, 2003) and (Fly-
vbjerg, 2006). According to (Yin, 2003) 
archival analysis in case study research 
can be used to answer such questions 
as what, how often and when. Concern-
ing the validity and reliability of this 
research, the use of this type of rich 
public evidence, archival records and 
documentation, has both advantages 
and disadvantages. Typically archival 
and documentary data are completed 
with other types of evidence such as in-
terviews; hence our sources of evidence 
may potentially affect the validity of our 
findings. On the other hand the large po-
tential of this Research Method1 in this 
field, combined with the possibility to 
rely on multiple sources of evidences, 
are the main reasons for this method-
ological choice. This approach results 
in a simple integration of the informa-
tion without guiding readers’ opinion. 
Another advantage of the use of this 
kind of public data is the fact that we 
1   Traditional prejudices over this Research Method 
are answered by the considerations of (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). 
can openly discuss the data and our 
findings in the analysis, by posing the 
data and the findings for public critique. 
Such public critique may help to test the 
correctness of the content of our analy-
sis. The purpose is leading the reader 
to the outcomes of this work, supported 
by evidences listed.
Implementation 
The implementation of our case stud-
ies follows the “top down approach” 
presented in Figure 2. The purpose is to 
understand high-level decisions (typi-
cally governmental), and consequently 
analyze industry’s response. Final focus 
is given to single companies, with de-
tails about their path to enter the nu-
clear business.
With this approach our results and 
conclusions are useful at two different 
levels i.e.:
Governmental/policy2maker level: 
since the goal of a policy maker is to 
maximize the present and future wel-
fare of its citizens, it needs to under-
stand the macro aspects and drivers of 
a certain business. In order to maximize 
the outputs from its scarce resources 
(money, intellectual assets etc…) it 
needs to assign these resources where 
they are most effective, so it is neces-
sary to understand which type of firm 
deserves the greater support and how 
to provide it.
2  These four countries include the two largest 















1 (*) France PWR 1450 29.0 26.0 17.0 -
2 USA ALWR 900 17.7 20.5 16.5 9.0
3 USA ALWR 1300 18.6 21.6 17.2 9.2
4 Germany PWR 1380 32.0 28.7 20.9 13.8
5 (**) Korea PWR 1000 31.0 11.0 17.0 36.0
Table 1 Shares of NPP’s overnight costs, mainly from (NEA, 2000). 
(*)Data based on an average cost calculated for a series of 10 units, which includes a part of the first-of-a-kind costs. 
(**) Based on Korean plants 10-11, referring to (Sung and Hong, 1999). AE’s high share is due to the Technology  
Transfer costs.
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Firm level: a certain firm, consid-
ering its capabilities, assets and core 
business aims to understand if it would 
be profitable or not to enter in the nu-
clear business, and in case of, which 
benefits would be expected and which 
gaps have to be overcome. 
The parameters used for the country 
selection were the followings:
 X Development of a national nuclear 
power program
 X National companies being part of nu-
clear consortia
 X Presence of a national nuclear industry
 X Availability of scientific articles, re-
garding the country’s nuclear policies
 X Political situation
These parameters led to the choice of 
four main countries to analyze: Japan, 
USA, Republic of Korea, and France2. 
These are the first countries in terms of 
nuclear reactors built inside the country, 
excluding Russian Federation. According 
to (Yin, 2003), a Pilot Case Study was pre-
pared before developing the case stud-
ies. The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) first 
NPP project, with the contract’s bid won 
by the Korean Consortium led by KEPCO, 
has been the topic of this Pilot (see Ap-
pendix: Pilot Case Study: UAE’s bid for a 
new NPP project); Figure 3 shows coun-
tries and companies analyzed. For the 
purpose, sources of evidence are inte-
grated through the analysis of three dif-
ferent bibliographic reviews.
The sample considered in this pa-
per includes 21 companies involved in 
different NPP projects’ roles (Figure 3). 
The countries were these firms are based 
host a total of 237 NPPs (54% of World’s 
total). The bibliography analyzed (Table 
2) comprises scientific papers (organized 
in three different clusters – Korea & Ja-
pan, France & USA, UAE contract bid), 
technical reports (IAEA, NEA, MPR etc.) 
and archival records (JAIF, 2003) (Scien-
tech, 2010) (Industcards, 2011 a). Along 
with this documentation, every company 
was studied through websites, annual 
reports, news, archival records and con-
ferences reports.
The PDCs are defined elaborating and 
triangulating information from both archi-
val records (JAIF, Scientech, Industcards) 
and other sources (company website, an-
nual reports, news, technical reports). 







Korea Japan USA France
Scientific Literature
(Sung and Hong, 1999) (Choi et al., 2009) (Ahn and 
Han, 1998) (Park, 1992) (Valentine and Sovacool, 2010) 
(Lesbirel, 1990) (Pickett, 2002) (Park and Chevalier, 
2010) (Berthelémy and Lévêque, 2011)
(Leny Pellissier-Tanon, 1984) (Collingridge, D., 1984 a) 
(Collingridge, D., 1984) (Golay, Saragossi and  
Willefert, 1977) (Grubler, 2010) (Roche, 2011) 
(Boulin and Boiteux, 2000) (David and Rothwell, 
1994) (Plantè, 1998) (Davis, 2011)
Technical Reports NEA, 2000) (IAEA, 2007) (MPR, 2005) (MPR, 2004) (MPR, 2010) (IAEA, 2000)
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Table 2 The sample: every company has been analyzed through websites, annual reports, news and archival records.
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The first step involves the subdivision 
of NPPs, according to the different tech-
nologies (PWR and BWR). Then, NPPs are 
chronologically ordered respect to the 
date of order of the plant itself (or the con-
struction start, according the available 
information); these tables have been the 
basis to develop the cases. Governmental 
issues (connected with agreements, poli-
cies, and laws promoting nuclear power 
development) were analyzed through 
scientific papers, which discussed about 
those topics diffusely. The national indus-
try situation and companies’ information 
were deducted from the other sources of 
evidence available (Annual Reports, Web-
sites, News, and Technical Reports).
The study of governmental approaches 
to develop nuclear power programs pro-
vided information about the common strat-
egies adopted in the countries interested 
in developing a national nuclear industry. 
In particular the cases highlight the 
possible choices of:
 X Having a series of turn-key contracts 
deployed by foreign suppliers (if do-
mestic industries have not capabilities 
in the nuclear sector or the govern-
ment is not interested in developing 
a national nuclear industry - i.e. UAE).
 X Founding joint ventures between local 
and foreign companies, if local indus-
tries are supported by local govern-
ment (i.e. France, with Framatome), 
with a Technology Transfer purpose.
 X Co-operation agreements (i.e. Toshiba 
and General Electric, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries and Westinghouse) with lo-
cal participation since first projects. 
This is the case of an already devel-
oped local industry.
In each Case Study, domestic self-reli-
ance was achieved after several proj-
ect participations. This fact, compared 
through the analysis of archival records, 
showed that construction’s prime con-
tractual role is to involve local compa-
nies since the first national projects i.e. 
to increase the so called “local content”. 
Usually the TG supply’s prime contracts 
are often controlled and detained by the 
NSSS suppliers. Technology Transfer 
processes highlighted the fact that some 
roles (such as AE and NSSS supplier) 
require a long time to develop knowl-
edge by the Learning-by-doing process. 
Companies were then analyzed through 
the prime contractual role point of view. 
Main information obtained regarded:
 X Companies’ history.
 X Acquisitions, mergers, partnerships.
 X Technology Transfer through other 
companies.
 X Nuclear business development.
The information was used to create a 
qualitative matrix, to highlight different 
paths followed by the companies, and 
focus on similarities between choices. 
Figure 4 shows an example of matrix for 
the Shaw Group: it presents the “nuclear 
path”, with motivations deducted by evi-
Figure 3  Multiple-Case Study approach chosen: countries and companies analyzed.




























dences, causing the transitions between 
quadrants. All the information collected 
contributed to define these shifts. The 
matrix model is used for all the compa-
nies analyzed. Shifting is represented 
by an arrow and is tested by the analysis 
over the company’s history. In the side 
boxes are drawn reasons, events and 
strategies leading to the shifting. Figure 
5 shows the prospect of the sources and 
the integration process guiding to the 
Research Answers. 
Results
Barriers and enabling factors
Barriers to entry
The evaluation of the barrier to entry in 
nuclear market can be deducted from the 
integration of information contained in 
scientific papers and cross-case analysis 
of the case studies. 
The most evident barriers to entry 
in the nuclear market is the government 
support. Government’s support to na-
tional companies and the presence of 
a nuclear power program is a “Condicio 
sine qua non” to enter the field. Beside 
the government role, the case studies 
prove as there are not EPC companies 
directly entered the international nuclear 
market as a prime contractor. Each EPC 
(or major contractor) had past experi-
ences in national NPP projects, before 
shifting to foreign NPP projects. In pres-
ence of a governmental support other 
barriers are role-dependent, according 
to the prime contractual role assumed 
by the company. They are presented in 
Table 3.
Historically, technological barriers 
(i.e. the NSSS design capabilities, or the 
AE ones) were bypassed with a govern-
ment founding support (to self-develop 
the capabilities), or partnerships with 
foreign companies, through a Technol-
ogy Transfer process. The specific role of 
NSSS manufacturer presents the large-
forgings’ supply chain problem. Com-
panies such as Hitachi and Mitsubishi 
secured a share of Japan Steel Works’ 
stakes, in order to have privileged rela-
tions, with one of the few world suppliers 
of these components. The investment in 
a manufacturing plant capable to forge 
such components, according to (MPR, 
2010) is unprofitable unless it is fully 
exploited. As noticed, the construction’s 
prime contract seems to be the most ap-
pealing for a national EPC company.
Enabling factors to enter the nuclear 
market
Enabling factors are the capabilities that 
a company needs in order to satisfy the 
requirement of a prime contractual role. 





























Figure 5  Methodology and sources of evidence for the work: three different 












Reuters; The times, 
BBC, The New 







(three different archival sources)
· JAIF
· Industcards (website based on Platt's database)
· Scientech (US technical and management services company)
Answers to Research Questions: 
· PROJECT DELIVERY CHAIN
· BARRIERS TO ENTRY
· ENABLING FACTORS
· PATHS
· TIME & COSTS 
Case Studies' Methodology                  Cross-Case Analysis
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 X Technological know-how
Partial information about the enabling 
factors’ issue has been reported by 
(IAEA, 2007) (MPR, 2004) (MPR, 2005) 
(MPR, 2010). Several matches between 
data were found during the develop-
ment of Case Studies (Energybiz, 2007) 
(Roche, 2011). The enabling factors are 
strictly connected with the technical 
role assumed in the project’s context. 
A summary of the results is reported 
in Table 4.
One of the most important enabling 
factors to enter the nuclear business is 
the certification. American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers – ASME – is the 
Role
Government 





























Table 3 Barriers according to the prime contractual role covered by a company
Technical role 
in the project
“Other” barriers / 
Capabilities 
Basic design Detailed design Total
AE
Level of effort 
(man-hours)






Depending on NSSS, 
TG, BOP manufacturer 
design and site 
conditions
-
Period (years) Up to 2.5 0.5-1 3-5 3-5
Cost - - -
10% total NPP cost (not 
first of a kind)
Technical role 
in the project
Components’ design Qualifications Other enabling factors
NSSS and TG 
Manufacturing
Level of effort 
(MH)
20,000,000 ASME Certifications, 
depending on the 
particular component
Large forgings require sufficient manufacturing 
capabilities (for the Reactor Pressure Vessel)
Number of items 30,000
Technical role 
in the project
Preparation of site 
infrastructure









50 to 150 craftsmen
10-20 professional 
managers








Table 4 Enabling factors for NPP projects: subdivisions by contractual role. A synthetic description of capabilities 
required is shown, for any prime contractual role. (IAEA, 2007) (MPR, 2004) (MPR, 2005) (MPR, 2010)
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most recognized at a global level, how-
ever it is not the only one, e.g. French 
companies require the RCC-M Certifica-
tions (that are a development of ASME 
certification). ASME’s NA (Nuclear In-
stallation and Shop Assembly) and NPT 
(Nuclear Partials) stamps or equivalent 
are required to operate in the NPP’s con-
struction business. These stamps cer-
tificate the company’s capabilities in 
terms of assembly of components and 
welded parts of nuclear components 
(ASME, 2011 a) (ASME, 2011 b). Figure 
6 shows an extremely synthetic idea 
of Stamps required during a NPP proj-
ects: the scheme presents the main 
elements in a nuclear island requiring 
the ASME stamp certification. The syn-
thetic scheme puts focus on the differ-
ent stamps required. Parts of ASME 
Stamps are dedicated to the manufac-
turing process, but there are Stamps 
coping with the welding process, the 
assembly or the component supports. 
Qualifications involve nearly all the com-
panies participating in a NPP project. 





















































Figure 7 Typical pattern for AE’s prime 
contractors: almost all companies 
follow the “dotted” path: from 
national generic market to national 
nuclear market. Bechtel is the only 
company following the “continuous” 
pattern.
g i o r g i o  l o c a t e l l i  ·  m a u r o  m a n c i n i i  ·  h o w  e p c f i r m s c a n  e n t e r  t h e  n u c l e a r  r e n a i s s a n ce  ·  pp 534 - 551
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t e ch n o l o g y a n d  m a n a g e m e n t i n  c o n s t r u c t i o n  ·  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l  ·  4(2)2012542
(Voutsinos, 2009) reports information 
regarding ASME Qualifications in NPP 
projects. 
Another critical factor is the Tech-
nological Know-How. Technological 
Know-How in the construction of new 
NPPs involves the management of ad-
vanced techniques focused on short-
ening the project’s schedule. These 
techniques are mainly (Hitachi, 2008 
a) (Hitachi-GE, 2010 b) (Hitachi-GE, 
2010 a) (Toshiba America Nuclear En-
ergy, 2010):
 X Modularization;
 X Open-Top Construction;
 X Very-Heavy Lift cranes (VHL);
 X Pipe bending machines;
 X Automatic welding machines;
 X Automatic rebar assembly machines 
(for ABWRs).
General paths leading to a nuclear 
market entry
The Case Study methodology, along 
with the matrix approach, shows simi-
larities among companies. Similarities 
can be found between countries be-
ginning a nuclear program through a 
Technology Transfer’s process. A global 
picture of paths followed by the World’s 
major players has been generated by 
applying the matrix described in par. 
2.2 (i.e. Figure 4) and comparing dif-
ferent companies operating in same 
contractual roles. In the next sections 
Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the 
results of this analysis.
Architect/Engineering
Architect/Engineering companies deal 
with Technology Transfer processes. 
Large part of these companies shifted 
from national businesses to interna-
tional NPP projects partnership with 
NPP built inside the country (Figure 7). A 
remarkable example is KEPCO E&C that 
has been founded to achieve core tech-
nology capabilities and started from 
the nuclear field (KEPCO E&C, 2011). The 
only exception, Bechtel (Bechtel, 2011), 
reflects the business’ orientation of the 
company itself. Bechtel could be de-
scribed as a construction-oriented com-
pany (more than AE). In facts Bechtel’s 
path matches with results of the Con-
struction business’ matrix3.
3   This fact is due to the impossibility to split 
roles for a company operating in both A/E’s and 
Construction’s fields.
NSSS supplier and TG supplier
Each company analyzed shifted from 
national market to national nuclear busi-
ness then to international NPP projects 
(Figure 8).
This prime contractor’s role presents 
Technology Transfer’s issues, simi-
larly to the AE role. The know-how was 
achieved through partnerships (with 
governmental support, i.e. (Barrè, 
2008) (WNA, 2011 a)) and with synergic 
efforts in R&D since the first years after 
the WWII (i.e. (WNA, 2011 a), (WNA, 2011 
b)). The only exception is Areva since it 
started its path into nuclear business 
directly. Its foundation was committed 
to develop nuclear technology with the 
merger of Framatome (now AREVA NP), 
Cogema (now AREVA NC) and Technica-
tome (now AREVA TA) in 2001 (AREVA, 
2009). NSSS suppliers are also often TG 
suppliers for a NPP project. In France, 
where the government has a stronger 
decisional power than any other ana-
lyzed country (since its shareholdings 
in many national nuclear-related com-
panies) Alstom is the privileged TG sup-
plier (Alstom, 2011). This represents one 
of the few exceptions evidenced.  
Constructor
The largest part of analyzed companies 
entered national nuclear business start-
ing from international businesses (Fig-
ure 9). The exception is The Shaw Group. 
Before the acquisition of Stone & Web-
ster (S&W, 2011) (The New York Times, 
2000), its core business was mainly pip-
ing manufacturing (Shaw, 2011). The ac-
quisition of an historic large-engineer-
ing company such as Stone & Webster 
led to a direct entry into NPP projects’ 
business, with the “instantaneous” ac-
quisition of the capabilities. The Shaw 
Group shifted directly from national 
conventional market to national nuclear 
business. The Stone & Webster’s ac-
quisition is the motivation for Shaw’s 
“instantaneous” knowledge’s acquisi-
tion. Stone & Webster was a large-en-
gineering company already operating in 
nuclear business. Companies, after the 
Figure 8 Typical pattern for NSSS supply’s prime contractors: companies 
follow the green path. Areva started directly in the national nuclear market: 
























acquisition of an engineering-oriented 
company, followed a path more compat-
ible with the AE’s ones.
Learning process and time to enter 
the nuclear business
Time and costs required to enter the 
nuclear business depend mainly on the 
role covered into the PDC. Most of NPP 
projects in a country are built in parallel 
in order to benefit from early projects 
due to the learning curve process. So a 
year-based learning process estimate is 
not particularly indicative: for our pur-
poses time estimation will be defined in 
terms of number of projects participa-
tions. This approach has been used for 
Japanese, Korean, French and US NPPs 
see from Table 5 to Table 9.
Architect/Engineering
Time-to-market strongly relies on Tech-
nology Transfer and learning-by-doing 
processes. This evidence is reflected in 
KEPCO E&C and other companies such 
as EDF or Japanese ones (MHI, Hitachi, 













Plant 2 Kori 2 PWR (650) GILBERT WH GEC WH/GEC 1976-1983
Plant 3 Wolsong 1 PHWR (679) AECL AECL HP AECL 1975-1983
Plant 4 Kori 3 PWR (950) BECHTEL WH GE HDEC 1978-1986
Plant 5 Kori 4 PWR (950) BECHTEL WH WH HDEC 1978-1986
Plant 6 Yonggwang 1 PWR (950) BECHTEL WH WH HDEC 1979-1987
Plant 7 Yonggwang 2 PWR (950) BECHTEL WH WH HDEC 1979-1987








Plant 10 Yonggwang 3 PWR (1000) KOPEC/S&L DHI&C/WH DHI&C /GE HDEC 1987-1996
Plant 11 Yonggwang 4 PWR (1000) KOPEC/S&L DHI&C /WH DHI&C /GE HDEC 1987-1996




Table 5 First nuclear power plants built in Korea. Integrated from (Park, 1992) (Sung and Hong, 1999) (JAIF, 2003) 
(Scientech, 2010) (Industcards, 2011 b)
Figure 9 Typical pattern followed by Constructors’ prime contractors: almost 
all companies follow the “dotted” path. Only The Shaw Group shifted directly 
from national conventional market to national nuclear business. The Stone & 
Webster’s acquisition is the motivation for Shaw’s “instantaneous” acquisition 
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(Sung and Hong, 1999) (Roche, 2011). 
KEPCO E&C started achieving capabili-
ties from the detailed design along with 
Bechtel during the project to build the 
4th, 5th, 8th and 9th Korean plants. Basic 
design was then obtained along with S&L 
through Technology Transfer in plants 
10& 11. So the total experience to achieve 
self-reliance went from plant 4 to plant 11 
(Table 5) (Sung and Hong, 1999).
 The situation is different in the 
French scenario, since the French Nu-
clear Power Program was based on the 
multiple-package contract approach. 




Date of order Owner/ Utility AE NSSS supplier TG supplier Constructor












Genkai-1 529 1969 Kyushu EPCO MHI MHI MHI Obay/various












Mihama-3 780 1972 Kansai EPCO MHI MHI MHI
Hazama/
Takenaka








AE NSSS supplier TG supplier Constructor




















Fukushima I-3 760 1970 TEPCO Toshiba Toshiba/IHI Toshiba
Kumagai/
Kajima
Hamaoka-1 515 1971 Chubu EPCO Toshiba Toshiba (IHI) Hitachi (various)
Tokai-2 1060 1971 JAPC EBASCO GE GE
Shimizu/
Kajima




Table 7 First BWR nuclear power plants built in Japan. Elaborated from (JAIF, 2003) (Scientech, 2010) (WNA, 2011 a) 
(Industcards, 2011 c)
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the help of subcontractors (Roche, 2011). 
Regarding Japanese companies (like Hi-
tachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi) there is 
evidence of a relatively shorter time-to-
market for the AE role, since relationship 
with foreign suppliers were limited to 
one or two plants, usually FOAKs of this 
size series (Table 6 and Table 7).
Considering the US Case Study, 
The Shaw Group is an important ex-
ample of instantaneous entry. The ac-
quisition of S&W (S&W, 2011) (The New 
York Times, 2000), previously experi-
enced on such projects in USA (Table 
8 and Table 9), enabled Shaw to enter 
the market. The costs to become an AE 
are difficult to estimate, since Tech-
nology Transfer and learning by do-
ing techniques are often involved. The 
lack of information about Technology 
Transfer costs and license costs does 
not permit further analysis.
NSSS supplier
The topic is similar to the AE one but the 
discussion must be detailed in terms of 
NSSS design and NSSS manufacturing. 
Korean Case Study is the main source of 
information about Technology Transfer 
process for NSSS design (plant 4 KAERI 
started developing NSSS design capa-
bilities through Technology Transfer and 
learning-by-doing processes). According 
to Table 5, self-reliance was achieved 
at the time of Plants 10 & 11, through a 
strong agreement with CE (now WH) that 
brought KAERI to a 95% (Sung and Hong, 
1999) share of NSSS design in 1995. In-
formation on NSSS manufacturing shows 
that a similar path was followed by local 
manufacturers (Hanjung, later acquired 
by Doosan Group); an 87% share of lo-
cal participation in NSSS manufactur-
ing were achieved in 1995. DHI&C com-
pleted Changwon Plant Site in 1982, with 
a 13,000 tons press (WNA, 2011 c). In 
the UAE bid Westinghouse still supplies 
a 5-7% of components (nuclear design 
code, RCP, MMIS) for which Korean com-
panies are not self-reliant. Korean gov-
ernment had an important role in this 
process, signing a bilateral agreement 
with the U.S.A. and supporting local 
manufacturing industries with several 
ad hoc policies (Sung and Hong, 1999).
Focusing on France the NSSS design 
and manufacturing roles were both un-
dertaken by Framatome (now Areva), 
with the specialized knowledge acquired 







AE NSSS supplier TG supplier Constructor
Ginna 581 1965 RG&EC GILBERT WH WH BECHTEL
Indian Point 2 1025 1965 ENTERGY N UE&C WH WH UE&C







Fort Calhoun 482 1966 OPPD G&H WH GE G&H/D&R
H.B. Robinson 
2
710 1966 PROGRESS EBASCO WH WH EBASCO
Table 8 First PWR (Pressurized water reactor) nuclear power plants built in USA. Elaborated from (JAIF, 2003) (Scientech, 2010) 
(WNA, 2011 a) (Industcards, 2011 d) (Industcards, 2011 e) (Industcards, 2011 f) (Industcards, 2011 g) (Industcards, 2011 h)  







AE NSSS supplier TG supplier Constructor
Nine Mile 
Point 1
621 1963 CNG NIMO GE GE SHAW/NIMO
Oyster Creek 1 615 1963 AMERGEN B&R GE GE B&R
Dresden 2 867 1965 EXELON N S&L GE GE UE&C
Pilgrim 1 685 1965 ENTERGY N BECHTEL GE GE BECHTEL
Browns Ferry 1 1040 1966 TVA TVA GE GE TVA
Table 9 First BWR (Boiling water reactor) nuclear power plants built in USA. Elaborated from (JAIF, 2003) (Scientech, 2010) 
(WNA, 2011 a) (Industcards, 2011 d) (Industcards, 2011 e) (Industcards, 2011 f) (Industcards, 2011 g) (Industcards, 2011 h) 
(Industcards, 2011 i) (Industcards, 2011 l) (Industcards, 2011 m) (Industcards, 2011 n) (Industcards, 2011 o) (Industcards, 2011 p)
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house, the licenser, took part in Frama-
tome establishment in 1958 along with 
other local companies (Boulin and Boit-
eux, 2000). Referring to the French Case 
Study, it is possible to estimate about 7 
NPP projects (including the Chooz pro-
totype) needed to Framatome to obtain 
self-reliance. In 1978 Westinghouse left 
Framatome shareholding, while the li-
cense expired in 1982 (Boulin and Boit-
eux, 2000). According to (Roche, 2011), 
companies providing NSSS design and 
manufacturing were already self-reliant 
at that date. 
A strong involvement of French gov-
ernment, thanks to relevant sharehold-
ings in key nuclear companies (EDF, Fram-
atome), influenced the whole Technology 
Transfer process (Leny Pellissier-Tanon, 
1984) (Golay, Saragossi and Willefert, 
1977). Japanese case study shows a 
shorter lead-time to reach self-reliance in 
NSSS design and manufacturing for both 
PWR and BWR technologies (see Table 6 
and Table 7). This peculiarity is influenced 
and connected to the strong governmen-
tal support to national nuclear industry 
for the fossil-fuel independence (WNA, 
2011 a) and the R&D efforts by Hitachi, 
Toshiba and MHI. US’ case study gives 
no useful information. U.S. companies 
(WH and GE – Table 8 and Table 9) were 
the “progenitors” of BWR and PWR tech-
nologies, developed during and after the 
WWII, thanks to strong R&D investments 
(WNA, 2011 b). In addition ASME certifi-
cations are needed to supply NSSS com-
ponents (Voutsinos, 2009) (ONE/TUV/
BV, 2009). The cost estimating for the 
NSSS Technology Transfer, similarly to 







(The New York 
Times, 2000)
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Table 10 Strategies followed by companies to enter the nuclear market: historic acquisitions considered for estimations. 





AE TG NSSS supplier NSSS Constructor
Figure 10  Mean acquisition costs
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AE, shows a lack of documentation which 
doesn’t permit any further analysis.
TG supplier
NSSS suppliers have a common con-
trol over TG prime contracts, reducing 
the importance and interest of this role 
for the purpose of this paper. In Korea 
local companies developed TG suppli-
ers’ skills through Technology Transfer 
process, similarly to the NSSS design 
and manufacturing (Table 5). In France 
Alstom was committed with TG supplies 
since the first NPPs (Table 8), while in 
Japan the same occurrence regarded 
MHI for PWR technology. Conventional 
TG suppliers can operate in nuclear 
business, since PWR technology has 
no radioactive fluids flowing into the 
turbines (Mehta and Pappone, 2008). 
It is important to highlight a minimum 
time-to-market for TG suppliers in BWRs 
(such as Hitachi and Toshiba –Table 6 
and Table 7), directly linked to the plant 
and its technological issues (Mehta and 
Pappone, 2008). In addition ASME certi-
fications are needed to supply TG com-
ponents (Voutsinos, 2009) (ONE/TUV/
BV, 2009).
Construction
This business appears to be the most 
interesting prime contractor’s role for a 
newcomer. Most of the countries high-
light a strong local participation since 
first NPP projects. No evidences were 
found to suggest relevant investments 
or time-to-entry for this role. A company, 
according to (IAEA, 2010) must be able 
to manage the advanced techniques re-
quired by the recent tendency of NPP 
projects to reduce construction sched-
ule. Thus ASME certifications are re-
quired for the installation of the equip-
ment (Voutsinos, 2009) (ONE/TUV/BV, 
2009). Nevertheless it is important to 
stress the importance of the “quality 
first” concept even for this role. (Ru-
uska et al., 2009) show as “Forssan Bet-
oni”, a concrete supplier for Areva in the 
Olkiluoto 3 project, failing to satisfy the 
quality standard procured a huge cost 
over budget and delay to the project. 
A strategic factor for allowing a firm to 
enter in the construction market is the 
reactor size: smaller is the size, easier 
is to enter (Locatelli and Mancini, 2010). 
So the strategic assets for firms willing 
to enter in this role are not the technical 
capabilities, whereas the skills in qual-
ity control and quality assurance. In this 
role the firms receive the designs from 
the vendors and AE, so the engineering 
skills are not really stressed, but it is 
crucial the correct execution.
Costs to enter the nuclear business 
and revenues
The final focus is on the costs and rev-
enues: the goal of this section is to pro-
vide an order of magnitude for the cost/
investment required to enter the nuclear 
market in one of the roles presented in 
the previous sections and its expected 
revenue. Table 10 includes the costs of 
acquisitions, mergers observed in the 
Case Studies’ developed for the differ-
ent contractual roles. The role is the 
key factor in this analysis: on one side 
the Constructor is characterized by the 
absence of core-technologies (beside 
mainly quality certifications) specific 
for the nuclear industry, on the opposite 
side the NSSS supplier is the role involv-
ing the greater investments.
Figure 10 presents the Mean acqui-
sition costs, evaluated through data 
elaboration of past acquisitions. Core-
technology companies (NSSS suppli-
ers) require the larger amount of cash, 
according to the companies analyzed. 
Table 11 and Figure 11 show the project 
cost estimations according to the differ-
ent roles. The Construction prime con-
tractors grant a significant share of to-
tal project’s value. Despite the peculiar 
specialization required to design and 
build the elements in the nuclear area 
(Core, Control road, pumps, heat ex-
changer etc.) these items account for a 
minor share of the overnight cost. Most 
of the overnight cost is related to the 
Balance Of Plant (BOP) and civil works 
(e.g. pouring concrete). That is the rea-
son why the “construction” can be so 
interesting for all the EPC companies.
Conclusions: Answers to the 
Research Questions
The conclusions of this paper are 
the answer to the research questions
Q1: Which are the drivers shap-
ing the PDC in a nuclear power plant 
project?
Since the presence of a national nu-
clear power program enables national 
companies to enter the business, the 
government is the most influencing 
driver in the shaping of a NPP PDC. As 















3009 Jap ABWR 1330 4,002 1,027 863 709 680
3382 USA PWR 1350 4,566 1,172 984 809 776
3860 Fra EPR 1630 6,292 1,614 1,357 1,115 1,070
1556 Kor APR1400 1343 2,090 536 451 370 355
1976 Kor OPR1000 954 1,885 484 406 334 320
Table 11 Contract values' subdivision: estimates (NEA, 2000) (IEA & NEA, 2010)
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the decisions to start the nuclear power 
program has been taken not by single 
utilities, but from the “national policy 
makers” i.e. the national governments. 
The government drives also the Technol-
ogy Transfer process, which is basic in 
order to develop a self-reliant national 
nuclear industry. Partnerships and alli-
ances are significant drivers, creating 
opportunities for local companies in par-
ticipating at NPP projects.
Q2: Which are the main barriers to 
enter the nuclear power plant business 
sector?
The support of the national govern-
ment is the greatest barrier in the nu-
clear business. In absence of a national 
nuclear power program, no company can 
enter nuclear business as a prime con-
tractor. Other barriers depend on the 
prime contractual role. Technology Trans-
fer processes, investments and partner-
ships are important to overcome them.
Q3: Which are the enabling factors 
leading a company to proficiently enter 
the nuclear power plant business?
Enabling factors for companies can 
be summarized as: Workforce, Qualifica-
tions, Technological know-how. These 
three factors are required differently for 
prime contractual roles analyzed: in par-
ticular it is remarkable the Qualification’s 
role (ASME Stamps and RCC-M Qualifica-
tions are broadly required in NPP proj-
ects). Qualifications are required both 
to manufacturing companies, to con-
struction’s prime contractors and NSSS 
suppliers.
Q4: Do exist Paths, leading to an 
entry in nuclear power plant PDC?
The case study methodology shows 
the similarities between strategic paths 
followed by companies. No evidence 
has been found of companies directly 
entered into international nuclear 
business: the importance of a national 
nuclear program had been remarked. 
Furthermore, construction companies 
generally entered nuclear business af-
ter experiences in international proj-
ects. NSSS suppliers and AE’s prime 
contractors (roles involving a strong 
technological know-how) often entered 
the national nuclear business through 
Technology Transfer processes and ef-
forts in R&D during the first years after 
the World War II.
Q5: How much time and investment 
must a company face to enter nuclear 
power plant business? Are they dif-
ferent along with diverse contractual 
roles?
The appropriate way to evaluate re-
quired time is the number of participa-
tions in NPP projects. Different roles 
require different time: AE and NSSS sup-
pliers’ prime contractors acquired the 
knowledge through a Technology Trans-
fer process. This route took 6 to 7 NPP 
project participations (for French and 
Korean situation) for the NSSS design 
and manufacturing capabilities and the 
same for the development of AE skills. 
Japan developed skills of this kind in a 
shorter time (about 3 NPP project par-
ticipations), due to its strong efforts 
in R&D. Costs connected with acquisi-
tions of companies to enter nuclear busi-
ness have been analyzed through past 
acquisitions: NSSS suppliers’ invested 
the higher amounts. Remarkable is that 
Japanese construction companies par-
ticipated in national NPP projects since 
the beginning.
Appendix: Pilot Case Study: 
UAE’s bid for a new NPP project
As shown in (Park and Chevalier, 2010) 
in 2009 a Korean Consortium, led by 
the Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO), won a $20 billion contract to 
develop a civilian NPP for the UAE (one 
of the World’s largest nuclear tenders 
on offer), beating French, U.S. and Japa-
nese rivals. The Korean Consortium was 
selected among two other proposals, 
made by Areva and General Electric-
Hitachi, in a decision process strongly 
affected by price. Figure 12 shows the 
Korean Consortiums’ components in 
details.
The Korean Standardized Nuclear 
Reactors (KSNR), leading to the current 
OPR-1000 and APR-1400 nuclear reac-
tors produced by Korea, are based on 
the U.S. Combustion Engineering (now 
Westinghouse) reactor called System 






















Figure 12 - Korean Consortium winning in UAE. Elaborated from (Park and Chevalier, 2010) (Berthelémy and Lévêque, 2011)
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to become completely self-sufficient 
for the technologies still supplied by 
Westinghouse, which include the nu-
clear design code, the reactor coolant 
pumps and the man-machine interface 
systems. This statement highlights 
the macro-importance of partnerships 
and strategic alliances in nuclear power 
business, along with the Technology 
Transfer process. The Case Study dif-
fusely bases on scientific papers, ana-
lyzing reasons that led to the Korean vic-
tory. Costs, referring to (Berthelémy and 
Lévêque, 2011), were one of the most 
important. The APR1400, at the time 
in construction phase, in Korea had an 
overnight cost estimate about 60% less 
expensive than the EPR in construction 
in France by Areva, and 32% less ex-
pensive than the EPR and AP1000 in 
construction in China. The paper then 
defines other parameters important 
for the winning bid: shutdown perfor-
mances and contract risks allocation 
are examples of effective factors.
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